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Policies to Reduce Rent Seeking in Controlled Markets

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  • Sunwoong Kim
  • Yoon-Ha Yoo

Abstract

We analyze the effects of various policies to reduce rent seeking in the controlled market in which buyers have heterogeneous valuation regarding the coveted good. The good is allocated according to the buyer-specific signal ('test score'), which is determined by the quantity of wasteful 'rent seeking' exerted by the buyer. We consider three common forms of market control: minimum qualification score, quota, and price ceiling. The potential buyers with higher valuations are more likely to receive the good in equilibrium, while they exert more rent-seeking efforts. Marginally relaxing market control does not necessarily decrease the aggregated amount of rent-seeking activities, and the effectiveness of policy measures usually depends on the current degree of competitiveness in the market.

Suggested Citation

  • Sunwoong Kim & Yoon-Ha Yoo, 2007. "Policies to Reduce Rent Seeking in Controlled Markets," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(1), pages 27-47.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:intecj:v:21:y:2007:i:1:p:27-47
    DOI: 10.1080/10168730601180853
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