IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/fglcxx/v9y2008i1-2p136-168.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Economic draining -- German black market operations in France, 1940--1944

Author

Listed:
  • Paul Sanders

Abstract

Study of the black market is vital to understanding the social, economic and political stakes of the occupation in the Second World War. It allows a re-examination of German occupation policy, but also highlights civilian survival strategies, wealth distribution and the changing occupier -- occupied relationship. In France, the German occupiers spent at least 15% of all financial resources made available to them through the Vichy occupation levy on the illegal market. This purchasing started from the onset of occupation and until the December 1941 resource crisis; German economic agencies bought ‘anything, at any price’. This uncoordinated bidding led to a black market bubble, the effects of which spilled over into the official markets where they caused havoc. Spring 1942 brought the centralisation of purchasing. During the ensuing second phase (until spring 1943), the occupier still bought ‘anything’, but no longer at ‘any price’. Although this stabilised prices, it also encouraged illegal production, with raw materials diverted from official industry allocations. During this period 50--60% of all Vichy occupation payments were spent on the black market, at a strategic juncture of the war when such extravagance was no longer justifiable. This undermined German finances in France and became a liability to exploitation and collaboration. The third phase of black market exploitation, from summer 1943 to the end of the occupation, was the most rational. The Germans restricted purchasing to genuinely indispensable strategic raw materials. This built on the effective implementation of a German black market purchasing ban in spring 1943, the support of the Vichy government and French industrial leaders for economic collaboration, business concentrations and closures, market monitoring and resource management methods. As a result, the illegal market in the industrial economy was largely controlled. Arguably the same degree of economic mobilisation could have been achieved one or even two years earlier, had the Germans abstained from unilateral black market purchasing and instead heeded Vichy calls for closer cooperation. German failure in this area was due to lack of coordination, institutional chaos, economic dilettantism, endemic corruption and reckless resource competition; all have their origin in the structure of the Nazi system. Illegal food markets, on the other hand, demonstrated the limits of coercion. As the nutritional value of official civilian rations remained below subsistence level, the French continued to depend on the illegal market for sustenance. Evading food restrictions became something of a national pastime. This further compounded Vichy's lack of willingness (and authority) in enforcing economic regulation in the countryside.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul Sanders, 2008. "Economic draining -- German black market operations in France, 1940--1944," Global Crime, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(1-2), pages 136-168, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:fglcxx:v:9:y:2008:i:1-2:p:136-168
    DOI: 10.1080/17440570701862876
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/17440570701862876
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/17440570701862876?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Maurie Cohen, 2011. "Is the UK preparing for “war”? Military metaphors, personal carbon allowances, and consumption rationing in historical perspective," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 104(2), pages 199-222, January.
    2. Georges Gallais-Hamonno & Thi-hong-van Hoang & Kim Oosterlinck, 2016. "Price Formation on Clandestine Markets: The Case of the Paris Gold Market during WWII," Working Papers CEB 16-048, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:fglcxx:v:9:y:2008:i:1-2:p:136-168. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/FGLC20 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.