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Do Good Intentions Pay Off? Employee Responses to Well-Intended Actions with Risky Outcomes

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  • Andreas Ostermaier
  • Peter Schäfer

Abstract

How does a subordinate react to the superior’s well-intended action when it is not certain that it will produce the intended outcome? The risk associated with the outcome creates moral wiggle room and thus poses a threat to the gift exchange between the superior and the subordinate. In a laboratory experiment, we first find that subordinates continue to reciprocate if the outcome risk is high. Second, however, subordinates’ response to a well-intended action that increases outcome risk depends on their inequality aversion. Weakly inequality-averse subordinates repay a kind action with a kind reaction if it decreases, but not if it increases, their outcome risk, whereas strongly inequality-averse subordinates react alike in both cases. Hence, a well-intended action is less worthwhile for subordinates if it increases than if it decreases outcome risk.

Suggested Citation

  • Andreas Ostermaier & Peter Schäfer, 2024. "Do Good Intentions Pay Off? Employee Responses to Well-Intended Actions with Risky Outcomes," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 33(1), pages 313-334, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:euract:v:33:y:2024:i:1:p:313-334
    DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2022.2085132
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