Knowledge utilization in the regulatory state: an empirical examination of Schrefler’s typology

When and how do regulatory agencies use expert knowledge? Schrefler (2010. “The Usage of Scientific Knowledge by Independent Regulatory Agencies.” Governance 23: 309–330; 2013. Economic Knowledge in Regulation: The Use of Expertise by Independent Agencies. Colchester, UK: ECPR Press) provides the most theoretically advanced answer to this question by arguing that two main independent variables impact knowledge utilization in agencies: the tractability of the policy problem under consideration, and the degree of political conflict surrounding the issue. Although Schrefler finds some support for her theory in three cases of regulatory policymaking by the UK Office of Communications, little effort has been made to test and refine her ideas outside of the UK context. In this paper, I take up that challenge by applying Schrefler’s theory to the case of the US Federal Communications Commission’s efforts to regulate cable television between 1956 and 1979. In addition to operationalizing Schrefler’s theory, I argue that two additional independent variables – legal directives and agency leadership – need to be considered when analyzing knowledge utilization by regulatory agencies.