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Bargaining tactics in construction disputes

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  • Martin Loosemore

Abstract

Bargaining is the initial and informal means by which parties attempt to resolve their differences during a construction dispute. However, knowledge of the bargaining process in construction projects is scant, with most attention being given to developing more formal, costly and reactive means of dispute resolution. This approach is questioned, in favour of a more efficient one based upon a better understanding of bargaining behaviour and improved bargaining skills. To this end, the behavioural complexities of the bargaining process during construction disputes are investigated. It is concluded that the majority of construction disputes are unintentional and escalate as a result of misunderstandings and tactical miscalculations during the bargaining process. A series of recommendations is set out to reduce the potential for unintentional escalation during a construction dispute.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Loosemore, 1999. "Bargaining tactics in construction disputes," Construction Management and Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(2), pages 177-188.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:conmgt:v:17:y:1999:i:2:p:177-188
    DOI: 10.1080/014461999371673
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    Cited by:

    1. Patrick Bajari & Stephanie Houghton & Steve Tadelis, 2006. "Bidding for Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis," NBER Working Papers 12051, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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