The Paradox of the New Great Game: Do Europe and China Need More Pipelines from Eurasia?

Transition to low-carbon energy is on the political agenda of most developed states, supported by investment in green technologies and legislative initiatives. The EU is actively elaborating the 2050 climate and energy policy framework and has adopted the Long-Term Low Greenhouse Gas Emission Development Strategy to make the EU ‘climate-neutral’ by 2050. Meanwhile, China’s President Xi Jinping announced China’s goal to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. These strategic goals are in line with China’s and the EU’s international commitment to ‘global climate action’ under the 2016 Paris Accords. These plans go in stark contrast with rising investment in pipeline projects in Central Asia and the South Caucasus that compete with Russia’s expanding transit capacities and with the dramatic development of LNG markets in Europe and Asia. The New Great Game seems to have been turning 180°—from rivalry among consumers over upstream assets and transportation routes in Central Asia and the South Caucasus towards competition between producers over sales markets in Europe and China, although the recent and sudden global gas supply crisis suggests a more complicated picture. So, what do the net-zero strategies mean for Eurasia? This article attempts to answer this question by exploring the prospects for gas pipeline expansion amid the carbon neutrality pledges of the major net consumers.