IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/applec/v54y2022i20p2275-2287.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Vertical collusion in the shipping container transport chain over the deregulation tariff of port authority

Author

Listed:
  • Gang Dong
  • Jin Li
  • Paul Tae-Woo Lee

Abstract

This article investigates the impact of cost difference on vertical collusion between a container port and a liner from the perspective of a shipping container transport chain, taking the deregulation tariff of port authority into consideration. It develops a two-stage game model and then performs simultaneous and sequential games. A finding in this article is that the higher the cost difference between the two shipping container transport chains, the greater the possibility of vertical collusion between the container port and liner. Furthermore, the article found that in the case of an infinite repeated game, the stability of vertical collusion is not only subject to the cost difference but also affected by the terminal handling charge (THC) and collusive choice of counterpart.

Suggested Citation

  • Gang Dong & Jin Li & Paul Tae-Woo Lee, 2022. "Vertical collusion in the shipping container transport chain over the deregulation tariff of port authority," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 54(20), pages 2275-2287, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:applec:v:54:y:2022:i:20:p:2275-2287
    DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2021.1987379
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/00036846.2021.1987379
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/00036846.2021.1987379?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:applec:v:54:y:2022:i:20:p:2275-2287. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/RAEC20 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.