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Ministererlaubnis für die Fusion Miba/Zollern: europäische Champions statt Wettbewerb?
[The Miba/Zollern Case on a Ministerial Approval: European Champions Instead of Competition?]

Author

Listed:
  • Oliver Budzinski

    (Technische Universität Ilmenau)

  • Annika Stöhr

    (Technische Universität Ilmenau)

Abstract

Zusammenfassung Nachdem das Bundeskartellamt die Fusion von Miba und Zollern abgelehnt hat, haben die beiden Unternehmen eine Ministererlaubnis beantragt. Dabei wurden bekannte, aber auch neue Gründe genannt, um einen Gemeinwohlvorteil des antikompetitiven Zusammenschlusses aufzuzeigen. Die Autoren untersuchen diese Gründe wirtschaftstheoretisch und kommen zu dem Ergebnis, dass der Bundeswirtschaftsminister die Erlaubnis nicht erteilen sollte. Zudem empfehlen sie eine grundsätzliche Überarbeitung des Instruments Ministererlaubnis.

Suggested Citation

  • Oliver Budzinski & Annika Stöhr, 2019. "Ministererlaubnis für die Fusion Miba/Zollern: europäische Champions statt Wettbewerb? [The Miba/Zollern Case on a Ministerial Approval: European Champions Instead of Competition?]," Wirtschaftsdienst, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 99(7), pages 505-510, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:wirtsc:v:99:y:2019:i:7:d:10.1007_s10273-019-2482-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s10273-019-2482-0
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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