IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/wirtsc/v99y2019i2d10.1007_s10273-019-2407-y.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Insolvenzregime für Staaten: ein gefährlicher Irrweg für den Euroraum
[Insolvency Regime for States: A Dangerous Path for the Euro Area]

Author

Listed:
  • Fabian Lindner

    (IMK in der Hans-Böckler-Stiftung)

Abstract

Zusammenfassung Die Finanzminister der Eurozone haben ein Insolvenzrecht für Staaten vorgeschlagen. So soll der „European Stability Mechanism“ nur dann finanzielle Hilfen für Mitgliedstaaten bereitstellen, wenn deren Schuldentragfähigkeit sichergestellt ist. Sonst droht der Schuldenschnitt. Weil die Schuldentragfähigkeit aber ein systematisch unklares Kriterium für Insolvenz ist, erhöht sich dauerhaft das Zahlungsausfallrisiko von Staaten im Euroraum. Das erhöht die Zinsen und belastet so Wachstum und Beschäftigung. Um den Euroraum nicht politisch und ökonomisch zu destabilisieren, muss die Europäische Zentralbank ein indirekter Lender of Last Resort für Staaten werden. Eine kritische Sicht auf die mögliche „Insolvenz“ bedeutet allerdings nicht, dass Regeln zur Begrenzung der Schulden grundsätzlich abzulehnen wären. Die bestehenden Regeln müssten aber deutlich verbessert werden.

Suggested Citation

  • Fabian Lindner, 2019. "Insolvenzregime für Staaten: ein gefährlicher Irrweg für den Euroraum [Insolvency Regime for States: A Dangerous Path for the Euro Area]," Wirtschaftsdienst, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 99(2), pages 133-140, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:wirtsc:v:99:y:2019:i:2:d:10.1007_s10273-019-2407-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s10273-019-2407-y
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10273-019-2407-y
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10273-019-2407-y?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Jan Priewe, 2020. "Why 60 and 3 percent? European debt and deficit rules - critique and alternatives," IMK Studies 66-2020, IMK at the Hans Boeckler Foundation, Macroeconomic Policy Institute.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
    • F45 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Macroeconomic Issues of Monetary Unions

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:wirtsc:v:99:y:2019:i:2:d:10.1007_s10273-019-2407-y. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.