IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/wirtsc/v96y2016i9d10.1007_s10273-016-2031-z.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Nimmt der Länderfinanzausgleich den Anreiz zum Steuervollzug?
[Does Fiscal Equalisation Among Germany’s Federal States Remove Their Incentive for Tax Enforcement?]

Author

Listed:
  • Axel Troost

    (Fraktion DIE LINKE)

Abstract

Zusammenfassung Zunehmend stehen die Bundesländer in der Kritik, ihrer Aufgabe des Steuervollzugs nur unzureichend nachzukommen. Als Ursache wird angeführt, dass es an finanziellen Anreizen fehle: Die Bundesländer müssen die Personalkosten tragen, dürften infolge des Länderfinanzausgleichs jedoch nur Bruchteile der zusätzlichen Einnahmen behalten. Der Autor zeigt auf, dass das nicht stimmt: Zusätzliches Prüfpersonal brächte den Bundesländern immer noch gute Renditen. Zudem dürfen gerade finanzstärkere Länder größere Anteile ihres Steueraufkommens einbehalten, prüfen aber tendenziell weniger. Höhere finanzielle Anreize gehen folglich sogar mit schlechterem Steuervollzug einher.

Suggested Citation

  • Axel Troost, 2016. "Nimmt der Länderfinanzausgleich den Anreiz zum Steuervollzug? [Does Fiscal Equalisation Among Germany’s Federal States Remove Their Incentive for Tax Enforcement?]," Wirtschaftsdienst, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 96(9), pages 660-666, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:wirtsc:v:96:y:2016:i:9:d:10.1007_s10273-016-2031-z
    DOI: 10.1007/s10273-016-2031-z
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10273-016-2031-z
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10273-016-2031-z?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Pablo Burriel & Panagiotis Chronis & Maximilian Freier & Sebastian Hauptmeier & Lukas Reiss & Dan Stegarescu & Stefan Van Parys, 2020. "A fiscal capacity for the euro area: lessons from existing fiscal-federal systems," Occasional Papers 2009, Banco de España.
    2. Matías Dewey & Donato Di Carlo, 2022. "Governing through non‐enforcement: Regulatory forbearance as industrial policy in advanced economies," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 16(3), pages 930-950, July.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:wirtsc:v:96:y:2016:i:9:d:10.1007_s10273-016-2031-z. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.