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Sollten Zentralbanken unabhängig sein? Neue Diskussionen über ein altes Dogma

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  • Stefan Schäfer

Abstract

After the Deutsche Bundesbank was established as Germany’s central bank in 1957, a high degree of independence soon became its signature feature. Interestingly, the German obsession with central bank independence (CBI) did not resonate with academics and practitioners in other countries until the late 1980s, when CBI increasingly became a standard feature of nearly all major central banks. Today, as a growing number of monetary theory experts casts doubts on the inflation-lowering effects of CBI, it is under fire again. Against the background of an intensified discussion about the future of central banks and central banking, this might be highly relevant. It could be that the golden age of independent central banks is over. Copyright ZBW and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Suggested Citation

  • Stefan Schäfer, 2014. "Sollten Zentralbanken unabhängig sein? Neue Diskussionen über ein altes Dogma," Wirtschaftsdienst, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 94(1), pages 69-75, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:wirtsc:v:94:y:2014:i:1:p:69-75
    DOI: 10.1007/s10273-014-1627-4
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    Keywords

    B220; E58; E61;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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