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Not kennt kein Gebot? Sondervermögen als Speicher von Notlagenkrediten
[Debt Brake or Breach of the Rules? Building Budget Reserves in Times of Crisis]

Author

Listed:
  • Thiess Büttner

    (Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Nürnberg-Erlangen)

Abstract

The German federal government is facing criticism for using the exemption from the national debt brake due to the coronavirus crisis to expand the fiscal leeway for its future energy and climate policies. The budget dispute is taking place against the backdrop of a massive expansion of government debt in Europe. In the following, the author explain the critique of the latest supplementary budget and argues that the federal government has missed the opportunity to prove that the fiscal policy options within the existing rules are sufficient.

Suggested Citation

  • Thiess Büttner, 2022. "Not kennt kein Gebot? Sondervermögen als Speicher von Notlagenkrediten [Debt Brake or Breach of the Rules? Building Budget Reserves in Times of Crisis]," Wirtschaftsdienst, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 102(1), pages 23-26, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:wirtsc:v:102:y:2022:i:1:d:10.1007_s10273-022-3089-4
    DOI: 10.1007/s10273-022-3089-4
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    E62; H62; H77;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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