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Preference revelation with a limited number of indifference classes

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  • Donald E.Campbell

    ()
    (Department of Economics, The College of William and Mary, P.O. Box 8755 Williamsburg, VA 23181-8755, USA Department of Economics, Syracuse University, Maxwell Hall, Syracuse, NY x13244-1090, USA)

  • Jerry S. Kelly

    ()
    (Department of Economics, The College of William and Mary, P.O. Box 8755 Williamsburg, VA 23181-8755, USA Department of Economics, Syracuse University, Maxwell Hall, Syracuse, NY x13244-1090, USA)

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    Abstract

    Suppose that g is a strategy-proof social choice rule on the domain of all profiles of complete and transitive binary relations that have exactly m indifference classes. If $m \ge 3$ and the range of g has three or more members, then g is dictatorial. If m = 2, then for any set X of feasible alternatives, there exist non-dictatorial and strategy-proof rules that are sensitive to the preferences of every individual and which have X as range.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Spanish Economic Review.

    Volume (Year): 4 (2002)
    Issue (Month): 2 ()
    Pages: 151-158

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    Handle: RePEc:spr:specre:v:4:y:2002:i:2:p:151-158

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    Related research

    Keywords: Dictatorship; indifference classes; oligarchy; strategy-proof;

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    Cited by:
    1. Alexander Reffgen, 2011. "Generalizing the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 39-59, June.

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