Why one person one vote?
AbstractWe provide a simple justification as to why the core principal in liberal democracies the one-person-one-vote is desirable. We compare two possible constitutions. In a “fixed democracy”, each individual has one vote and the same opportunity to propose public projects. In a “flexible democracy”, those that set the agenda can additionally propose to limit future participation in voting and agenda-setting. We show that a fixed democracy restricts majorities from taxing minorities to a greater extent than a flexible democracy. A flexible democracy may be more suited to enable a polity to undertake public projects. This possible advantage may be too small to outweigh taxation distortions and citizens unanimously favor the one-person-one-vote rule ex ante. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.
Volume (Year): 23 (2004)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/index.htm
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- Naqvi, Nadeem & Neumärker, Bernhard & Pech, Gerald, 2012. "The rule of law and sustainability of the constitution: The case of tax evasion," The Constitutional Economics Network Working Papers 01-2012, University of Freiburg, Department of Economic Policy and Constitutional Economic Theory.
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