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A majorization comparison of apportionment methods in proportional representation

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Author Info
Friedrich Pukelsheim () (Institut für Mathematik, Universität Augsburg, D-86315 Augsburg, Germany)
Albert W. Marshall (Statistics Department, University of British Columbia, Vancouver BG, V6T 1Z2, Canada)
Ingram Olkin (Department of Statistics, Stanford University, Stanford CA, 94305-4065, USA)
Abstract

From the inception of the proportional representation movement it has been an issue whether larger parties are favored at the expense of smaller parties in one apportionment of seats as compared to another apportionment. A number of methods have been proposed and are used in countries with a proportional representation system. These apportionment methods exhibit a regularity of order, as discussed in the present paper, that captures the preferential treatment of larger versus smaller parties. This order, namely majorization, permits the comparison of seat allocations in two apportionments. For divisor methods, we show that one method is majorized by another method if and only if their signpost ratios are increasing. This criterion is satisfied for the divisor methods with power-mean rounding, and for the divisor methods with stationary rounding. Majorization places the five traditional apportionment methods in the order as they are known to favor larger parties over smaller parties: Adams, Dean, Hill, Webster, and Jefferson.

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Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 19 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 885-900
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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:19:y:2002:i:4:p:885-900

Note: Received: 5 August 2000/Accepted: 24 October 2001
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  1. Brams,S.L. & Kaplan,T.R., 2002. "Dividing the indivisible : procedures for allocating cabinet ministries to political parties in a parliamentary system," Working papers 340, University of Bielefeld, Insitute of Mathematical Economics. [Downloadable!]
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