IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/sochwe/v19y2002i2p281-294.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Probabilistic cheap talk

Author

Listed:
  • Bhaskar Chakravorti

    (The Monitor Company, 25 First St., Cambridge MA 02141, USA)

  • Bart Taub

    (Department of Economics University of Illinois, 330 Commerce West Building, Champaign, IL 61820, USA)

  • John P. Conley

    (Department of Economics University of Illinois, 330 Commerce West Building, Champaign, IL 61820, USA)

Abstract

We consider a model in which there is uncertainty over when a one-shot game will be played. We show how a mechanism designer can implement desirable outcomes in certain economic games by manipulating only the probability that the game is played in a given round while leaving all other aspects of the game unchanged. We also show that if there is no discounting, this uncertainty imparts a sequential structure that is almost mathematically equivalent to a repeated version of the game with discounting. In particular, a folk theorem applies to such games. Thus, games of probabilistic cheap provide a third interpretation of the repeated game framework with the additional feature that expected payoff is invariant to the probability of the game ending.

Suggested Citation

  • Bhaskar Chakravorti & Bart Taub & John P. Conley, 2002. "Probabilistic cheap talk," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(2), pages 281-294.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:19:y:2002:i:2:p:281-294
    Note: Received: 10 May 1999/Accepted: 16 October 2000
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/papers/2019002/20190281.pdf
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2004:i:3:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:19:y:2002:i:2:p:281-294. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.