A note on the non-emptiness of the stability set
AbstractPeleg (1978) presents a necessary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the core, by considering quota games. The purpose of this paper is to present a similar result for the non-emptiness of another solution concept introduced by Rubinstein (1980) and called the stability set.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.
Volume (Year): 17 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Note: Received: 25 January 1999/Accepted: 6 July 1999
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- Roland Pongou & Lawrence Diffo Lambo & Bertrand Tchantcho, 2008. "Cooperation, stability and social welfare under majority rule," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 555-574, June.
- Andjiga, Nicolas Gabriel & Moyouwou, Issofa, 2006. "A note on the non-emptiness of the stability set when individual preferences are weak orders," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 67-76, July.
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- Diffo Lambo, Lawrence & Tchantcho, Bertrand & Moulen, Joël, 2009. "A core of voting games with improved foresight," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 214-225, September.
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