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Public information and social choice

Author

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  • Hans Gersbach

    (Alfred-Weber-Institut, UniversitÄt Heidelberg, Grabengasse 14, D-69117 Heidelberg, Germany)

Abstract

We examine the value of public information when a society uses a social choice rule to decide among a set of outcomes. We require that a social choice function satisfies unrestricted domain, non-decisiveness and the Pareto principle. We show that there exist payoff structures for every social choice function, such that an arbitrary subset of voters is worse off by public information. We apply the proposition to collective information acquisition and to irreversible investments.

Suggested Citation

  • Hans Gersbach, 2000. "Public information and social choice," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 17(1), pages 25-31.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:17:y:2000:i:1:p:25-31
    Note: Received: 2 June 1997/Accepted: 30 September 1998
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    Cited by:

    1. Huber, Jurgen, 2007. "`J'-shaped returns to timing advantage in access to information - Experimental evidence and a tentative explanation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(8), pages 2536-2572, August.

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