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Aggregation of individuals' preference intensities into social preference intensity

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  • Charles M. Harvey

    (Department of Decision and Information Sciences, University of Houston, Houston, TX 77204-6282, USA)

Abstract

A result of John Harsanyi concerns the aggregation of individuals' preferences into social preferences. The result states that if the individuals in a society and the society as a whole have preference relations that compare probability distributions on a set of outcomes, and the preference relations satisfy expected-utility conditions and Pareto conditions, then a utility function for the social preference relation is a positive affine function of utility functions for the individuals' preference relations. This paper presents an analogous result for preference relations that denote intensity of preference, i.e., preference relations that compare exchanges of outcomes. This approach avoids the difficulties of requiring that the individuals in the society have common beliefs regarding uncertainty.

Suggested Citation

  • Charles M. Harvey, 1999. "Aggregation of individuals' preference intensities into social preference intensity," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 16(1), pages 65-79.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:16:y:1999:i:1:p:65-79
    Note: Received: 14 October 1996 / Accepted: 4 September 1997
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    Cited by:

    1. Mongin, Philippe, 2001. "The impartial observer theorem of social ethics," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 17(2), pages 147-179, October.

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