Personal income taxation under mobility, exogenous and endogenous welfare weights, and asymmetric information
AbstractThis paper analyses how governments should tax labour income accruing to a group of highly skilled and geographically mobile individuals who divide their time or career between several jurisdictions. The analysis differs from previous models on migration and taxation by addressing optimal regulation when agents work for several principals. Optimal taxation is developed for social welfare functions with exogenous and endogenous welfare weights. Marginal income taxes are applied for screening purposes, and the rates are lower with endogenous than with exogenous welfare weights.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Population Economics.
Volume (Year): 13 (2000)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Note: Received: 22 January 1998/Accepted: 3 July 1999)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00148/index.htm
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
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- Backlund, Kenneth & Sjögren, Tomas & Stage, Jesper, 2008. "Optimal Tax and Expenditure Policy in the Presence of Migration - Are Credit Restrictions Important?," UmeÃ¥ Economic Studies 749, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
- Vilen Lipatov & Alfons Weichenrieder, 2010.
"Optimal Income Taxation with Tax Competition,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
3108, CESifo Group Munich.
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