A conflict between sequential rationality and consistency principles
AbstractIt is shown that no solution concept that selects sequentially rational (perfect, proper, persistent, or members of some stable set of) equilibria satisfies the following consistency property. Suppose that in every solution of the game G, player i's action is a, and denote by Ga the game in which player i is restricted to choose a. Then some player j\neqi has an action c that is used with positive probability in both some solution of G and some solution of Ga. This result illustrates a conflict between a mild consistency condition and sequential rationality.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.
Volume (Year): 31 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Note: Received: January 2001/Final version: April 2002
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- Diego Lanzi, 2010. "Embedded choices," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 68(3), pages 263-280, March.
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