S. Berninghaus (Institut für Statistik u. Mathematische Wirtschaftstheorie, Universität Karlsruhe, 76128 Karlsruhe, Germany) H.-J. Ramser (Fakultät f. Volkswirtschaftslehre u. Statistik, Universität Konstanz, 78464 Konstanz, Germany) W. Güth (Institut für Wirtschaftstheorie III, Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, 10178 Berlin, Germany) R. Lechler (Institut für Wirtschaftstheorie III, Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, 10178 Berlin, Germany)
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Two parties X, and Y, can either bargain separately with a third party Z or merge to become XY and bargain collectively with Z. Depending on the payoff implications of the two possible contracts and on the asymmetry inherent in the conflict payoffs of X and Y collective bargaining will increase, decrease or leave constant what X and Y achieve together. In the experiment, first X and Y vote for or against collective bargaining and then negotiate accordingly. Participants react adequately to strategic aspects, but not as predicted by the (Nash-)bargaining solution.
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