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Cooperative Processing of Information via Choice at an Information Set


Author Info

  • Ichiishi, Tatsuro
  • Idzik, Adam
  • Zhao, Jingang


A specific structure is added to the model of Bayesian society, and the associated (more involved) version of the Bayesian incentive compatible strong equilibrium concept is proposed. The equilibrium endogenously explains whether or not player j in coalition S, in pursuit of his self-interest, decides to pass on his private information to the other members of S, and if he does which part of his private information he decides to pass on. Generic existence theorems for this equilibrium are established.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 23 (1994)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 145-65

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:23:y:1994:i:2:p:145-65

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Cited by:
  1. Sakaki, Yuki, 2006. "A Note on the Core of a Profit-Center Game with Incomplete Information and Increasing Returns to Scale," Discussion Papers 2006-06, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.


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