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Routines and incentives in group tasks

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Author Info
Alexis Garapin () (IREPD, Universit, Pierre Mend, s, France, BP 47, 38406 Grenoble, France)
Michel Hollard () (IREPD, Universit, Pierre Mend, s, France, BP 47, 38406 Grenoble, France)

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Abstract

The artificial context "Target the Two" has been used in experiments to explore some of the features of routinization and learning. Two agents must learn to coordinate their actions to achieve a common goal, without being allowed to use verbal communication. This article reports an experiment, in which we compare the degree of routinization and the performance of players in two treatments. Each treatment submits players to the same sequence of starting configurations, but differs in terms of the payoff function. In the first treatment (A), the payoff is based on the number of moves required to achieve the goal, whereas in the second treatment (B) the payoff depends on the time required for completion. We observe that (1) in treatment B subjects tend to play in a more "routinized" way and (2) treatment B reduces the time spent on play, but does not decrease the resources (the number of moves) used, relative to treatment A.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Evolutionary Economics.

Volume (Year): 9 (1999)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 465-486
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Handle: RePEc:spr:joevec:v:9:y:1999:i:4:p:465-486

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Related research
Keywords: Coordination - Incentives - Learning - Routine;

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Cited by:
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  1. Agnès Festré & Nathalie Lazaric, 2007. "Routines and leadership in Schumpeter and von Mises' analysis of economic change," Post-Print halshs-00271338_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
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