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Remarks on Nash equilibria for games with additively coupled payoffs (*)

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  • Erik J. Balder

    (Mathematical Institute, University of Utrecht, P.O. Box 80.010, 3508 TA Utrecht, THE NETHERLANDS)

Abstract

If the payoffs of a game are affine, then they are additively coupled. In this situation both the Weierstrass theorem and the Bauer maximum principle can be used to produce existence results for a Nash equilibrium, since each player is faced with an individual, independent optimization problem. We consider two instances in the literature where these simple observations immediately lead to substantial generalizations.

Suggested Citation

  • Erik J. Balder, 1996. "Remarks on Nash equilibria for games with additively coupled payoffs (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 9(1), pages 161-167.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:9:y:1996:i:1:p:161-167
    Note: Received: June 12, 1994; revised version June 16, 1995
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    Cited by:

    1. Peter Duersch & Jörg Oechssler & Burkhard Schipper, 2014. "When is tit-for-tat unbeatable?," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(1), pages 25-36, February.
    2. Arsen Palestini & Ilaria Poggio, 2015. "A Bayesian potential game to illustrate heterogeneity in cost/benefit characteristics," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 62(1), pages 23-39, March.
    3. Lina Mallozzi, 2013. "An application of optimization theory to the study of equilibria for games: a survey," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 21(3), pages 523-539, September.
    4. Peter Duersch & Jörg Oechssler & Burkhard Schipper, 2014. "When is tit-for-tat unbeatable?," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(1), pages 25-36, February.

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