Political competition in a model of economic growth: Some theoretical results (*)
AbstractWe analyze the role of political competition on the type of economic policies that are selected in a one sector model of economic growth. We identify conditions under which neoclassical optimal growth plans occur, and conditions in which political business cycles occur. We find that the ability commit to multi-period economic policy leads to less political stability of economic plans.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 7 (1996)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Note: Received: November 2, 1994
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm
Other versions of this item:
- Boylan, Richard. & Ledyard, John O. & McKelvey, Richard D., . "Political Competition in a Model of Economic Growth; Some Theoretical Results," Working Papers 780, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
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- Battaglini, Marco & Nunnari, Salvatore & Palfrey, Thomas, 2011. "Legislative bargaining and the dynamics of public investment," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2011-205, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
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