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Infinite inequality systems and cardinal revelations

Author

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  • Marcel Richter
  • Kam-Chau Wong

Abstract

Many economics problems are maximization or minimization problems, and can be formalized as problems of solving “linear difference systems” of the form $r_i-r_j \geqq c_{ij}$ and r k -r l > c kl , for r-unknowns, with given c-constants. They typically involve strict as well as weak inequalities, with infinitely many inequalities and unknowns. Since strict inequalities are not preserved under passage to the limit, infinite systems with strict inequalities are notoriously hard to solve. We introduce a unifying tool for solving them. Our main result (Theorem 1 for the countable case, Theorem [2] for the not-necessarily-countable case) introduces a uniform solvability criterion (the $\omega$ -Axiom), and our proof yields a method for solving those that are solvable. The axiom’s economic intuition extends the traditional ordinal notion of revealed preference to a cardinal notion. We give applications in producer theory, consumer theory, implementation theory, and constrained maximization theory. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005

Suggested Citation

  • Marcel Richter & Kam-Chau Wong, 2005. "Infinite inequality systems and cardinal revelations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(4), pages 947-971, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:26:y:2005:i:4:p:947-971
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-004-0578-1
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    Cited by:

    1. Marco Faravelli & Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2012. "(Don’t) Make My Vote Count," Discussion Papers Series 464, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
    2. József Sákovics, 2013. "Revealed cardinal preference," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 1(1), pages 39-45, May.

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