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On extensive form implementation of contracts in differential information economies

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Author Info
Dionysius Glycopantis
Allan Muir
Nicholas C. Yannelis
Abstract

In the context of differential information economies, with and without free disposal, we consider the concepts of Radner equilibrium, rational expectations equilibrium, private core, weak fine core and weak fine value. We look into the possible implementation of these concepts as perfect Bayesian or sequential equilibria of noncooperative dynamic formulations. We construct relevant game trees which indicate the sequence of decisions and the information sets, and explain the rules for calculating ex ante expected payoffs. The possibility of implementing an allocation is related to whether or not it is incentive compatible. Implementation through an exogenous third party or an endogenous intermediary is also considered. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-002-0299-2
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 21 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (03)
Pages: 495-526
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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:21:y:2003:i:2:p:495-526

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Related research
Keywords: Keywords and Phrases: Differential information economy; Private core; Radner equilibrium; Rational expectations equilibrium; Weak fine core; Weak fine value; Free disposal; Coalitional Bayesian incentive compatibility; Game trees; Perfect Bayesian equilibrium; Sequential equilibrium; Contracts.; JEL Classification Numbers: 020; 226.;

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  1. Carlos Hervés-Beloso & V. Martins-da-Rocha & Paulo Monteiro, 2009. "Equilibrium theory with asymmetric information and infinitely many states," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 295-320, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. João Correia-da-Silva & Carlos Hervés-Beloso, 2009. "Prudent expectations equilibrium in economies with uncertain delivery," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 67-92, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Glycopantis, Dionysius & Muir, Allan & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2004. "Non-implementation of Rational Expectations as a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium," Economics Series 148, Institute for Advanced Studies. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Dionysius Glycopantis & Allan Muir & Nicholas Yannelis, 2009. "On non-revealing rational expectations equilibrium," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 351-369, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Kóczy,László Á., 2005. "The Core Can Be Accessed with a Bounded Number of Blocks," Research Memoranda 042, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Faias, Marta & Hervés-Beloso, Carlos & Moreno García, Emma, 2009. "A price mechanism in economies with asymmetric information," MPRA Paper 15176, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  7. Martins-da-Rocha, V. F. & Angeloni, Laura, 2008. "Large economies with differential information but without free disposal," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 671, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
  8. Giovanna Bimonte & Maria Graziano, 2009. "The measure of blocking coalitions in differential information economies," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 331-350, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Erik Balder & Nicholas Yannelis, 2006. "Continuity properties of the private core," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 453-464, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Laura Angeloni & V. Martins-da-Rocha, 2009. "Large economies with differential information and without free disposal," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 263-286, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Guadalupe Fugarolas-Alvarez-Ude & Carlos Hervés-Beloso & Emma Moreno-García & Juan Torres-Martínez, 2009. "A market game approach to differential information economies," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 321-330, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Angeloni, Laura & Martins-da-Rocha, V. F., 2007. "Contract enforcement and incentive compatibility in large economies with differential information: the role of exact feasibility," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 647, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
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