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exposita note : Preference profiles sustaining Arrow's theorem

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Author Info
Antonio Quesada () (Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad de Murcia, Campus de Espinardo, 30100 Espinardo , SPAIN)

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Abstract

Arrow's theorem is proved on a domain consisting of two types of preference profiles. Those in the first type are "almost unanimous": for every profile some alternative x is such that the preferences of any two individuals merely differ in the ranking of x, which is in one of the first three positions. Profiles of the second type are "appropriately heterogeneous", with preferences similar to those generating the "paradox of voting".

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 20 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 623-627
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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:20:y:2002:i:3:p:623-627

Note: Received: March 9, 2000; revised version: June 7, 2001
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Related research
Keywords: Arrow's theorem; Domain restriction; Paradox of voting.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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