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exposita notes : On games with identical equilibrium payoffs

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Author Info
Indrajit Ray () (Department of Economics, University of York, Heslington, York YO10 5DD, UK)

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Abstract

This paper compares the sets of Nash, coalition- proof Nash and strong Nash equilibrium payoffs of normal form games which are closely related. We propose sufficient conditions for equivalent or closely related games to have identical sets of equilibrium payoffs.

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File URL: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/papers/1017001/10170223.pdf
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 17 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 223-231
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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:17:y:2001:i:1:p:223-231

Note: Received: April 23, 1999; revised version: November 23, 1999
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Related research
Keywords: Payoff equivalence; Strong Nash equilibrium; Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium; Correlation device.;

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

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