Externalities, expectations, and growth
AbstractThe paper studies a model of accumulation and growth where a continuum of heterogeneous firms play dynamically optimal strategies along a (rational expectations) equilibrium. The key feature of the model is that firms' technological decisions are assumed subject to both friction and external effects. This gives rise to a wide multiplicity of equilibrium behavior, any path of sustained growth requiring that the economy tackle a never-ending chain of fresh coordination problems. This setup is modelled as a (non-atomic) dynamic game, suitable conditions being provided that partially characterize when sustained growth is a possible (never the unique) equilibrium outcome.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 14 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Note: Received: May 25, 1995; revised version: March 25, 1998
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- O30 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - General
- O40 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - General
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