Convergence of the Aumann-Davis-Maschler and Geanakoplos bargaining sets
AbstractGeanakoplos  defined a notion of bargaining set, and proved that his bargaining set is approximately competitive in large finite transferable utility (TU) exchange economies with smooth preferences. Shapley and Shubik  showed that the Aumann-Davis-Maschler bargaining set is approximately competitive in replica sequences of TU exchange economies with smooth preferences. We extend Geanakoplos' result to nontransferable utility (NTU) exchange economies without smooth preferences, and we extend the Shapley and Shubik result to non-replica sequences of NTU exchange economies with smooth preferences.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 11 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Note: Received: November 11, 1996
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D41 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Perfect Competition
- D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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