Aristotelian Flourishing and Contemporary Philosophical Theories of Wellbeing

Several philosophical theories of wellbeing claim Aristotelian ancestry and employ an Aristotelian construct of flourishing. Yet it is not clear how we should interpret Aristotle’s notion of flourishing or eudaimonia (εὐδαιμονία). In this article, we offer an analysis of Aristotle’s notion of eudaimonia and consider to what extent it can be categorized within the framework of contemporary philosophical theories of wellbeing. We stress the active character of Aristotelian flourishing and its focus on the development of living things over time, which contrasts with the static and passive character of contemporary philosophical accounts of wellbeing. We suggest that Aristotle is closest to a perfectionist theory of wellbeing, though even this requires some qualification. While rational activity in accord with virtue is central to Aristotle’s account of living well, Aristotle also states that a range of practical human activities and propitious life circumstances are necessary (and, on some interpretations, constitutive) features of the flourishing life. As such, Aristotelian flourishing includes elements of moral and cognitive perfectionism as well as an objective list of external goods and presupposes one’s embeddedness within communities. We close with a consideration of the implications of our argument for the philosophical and social scientific study of flourishing. Contemporary well-being philosophers should be mindful of ways in which Aristotelian eudaimonia extends beyond the dominant philosophical categories of wellbeing that have a static focus and concern themselves with subjective experience or the possession of objective goods. Social scientists should be transparent about the limits of invoking an Aristotelian pedigree to motivate their own theories of wellbeing and should understand the implications of more limited conceptions.