Efficiency wages, wage comparison, and public sector budgeting
AbstractWe develop a government decision model where efficiency wage mechanisms affect the allocation of resources between different public services. We show how the introduction of interdepartment wage relativities modifies the standard Solow wage setting conditions. We compare the outcome under centralised and decentralised wage setting, and show that a decentralised wage setting system creates a distortion. Finally, we discuss the possibility of elimination this distortion using alternative financing systems. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2003
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economics of Governance.
Volume (Year): 4 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/10101/index.htm
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- Pérez, Javier J. & Sánchez, Jesús, 2010.
"Is there a signalling role for public wages? Evidence for the euro area based on macro data,"
Working Paper Series
1148, European Central Bank.
- Javier Pérez & A. Sánchez, 2011. "Is there a signalling role for public wages? Evidence for the euro area based on macro data," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 421-445, October.
- Javier J. Pérez & A. Jesús Sánchez, 2009. "Is there a signalling role for public wages? Evidence for the euro area based on macro data," Banco de Espaï¿½a Working Papers 0934, Banco de Espa�a.
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