IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/ecogov/v1y2000i3p199-212.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Social pressure, uncertainty, and cooperation

Author

Listed:
  • Steffen Huck
  • Dorothea Kübler

Abstract

We analyse the role of uncertainty in a sequential game where players have to decide whether to contribute to a public project or not. A player's payoff may depend on his belief about the other player's action which allows us to model social pressure. Using the theory of psychological games, we show that the players' propensity to choose an individually costly action such as cooperation in a public project may increase if there is some uncertainty about who has cooperated before. A central agency, e.g. the government, can induce incomplete information by using a randomization policy, thus crowding in private contributions. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2000

Suggested Citation

  • Steffen Huck & Dorothea Kübler, 2000. "Social pressure, uncertainty, and cooperation," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 199-212, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:1:y:2000:i:3:p:199-212
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2009. "Dynamic psychological games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 1-35, January.
    2. Nadia Oliva & Andrea Pacella, 2016. "Does Firms¡¯ Social Responsibility Counteract Some Critical Effects of Labor Market Flexibility?," Journal of Management and Sustainability, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 6(1), pages 109-120, March.
    3. Jagau, Stephan & Perea, Andrés, 2022. "Common belief in rationality in psychological games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Key words: social pressure; psychological games; cooperation; JEL classification: C72; H41;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:1:y:2000:i:3:p:199-212. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.