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On the Convergence to Nash Equilibrium in Problems of Distributed Computing

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  • T. Boulogne
  • E. Altman
  • O. Pourtallier

Abstract

This paper studies two problems that arise in distributed computing. We deal with these problems from a game theoretical approach. We are interested in the convergence to the Nash equilibrium of algorithms based on the best reply strategy in a special case of linear costs. We present three specific types of algorithm that converge to the equilibrium. In our first model, composed of two processors, the convergence is established through monotonicity of the sequence of updates generated by each of the three algorithms. In the second model, made up of N processors, the convergence is due to the contraction of the algorithms. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002

Suggested Citation

  • T. Boulogne & E. Altman & O. Pourtallier, 2002. "On the Convergence to Nash Equilibrium in Problems of Distributed Computing," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 109(1), pages 279-291, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:annopr:v:109:y:2002:i:1:p:279-291:10.1023/a:1016312521369
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1016312521369
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    Cited by:

    1. Amir Gandomi & Amirhossein Bazargan & Saeed Zolfaghari, 2019. "Designing competitive loyalty programs: a stochastic game-theoretic model to guide the choice of reward structure," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 280(1), pages 267-298, September.

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