On the Stability of Research Joint Ventures: Implications for Collusion
AbstractThough there is a body of theoretical literature on research joint venture (RJV) participation facilitating collusion, empirical tests are rare. Even more so, there are few empirical tests on the general theme of collusion. This note tries to fill this gap by assuming a correspondence between the stability of research joint ventures and collusion. By using data from the US National Cooperation Research Act, we show that large RJVs in concentrated industries are more stable and hence more suspect to collusion.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Intersentia in its journal Review of Business and Economic Literature (ReBEL).
Volume (Year): 57 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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Web page: http://www.rebel-journal.org/
empirical test; product market collusion; research joint ventures;
Other versions of this item:
- Seldeslachts, Jo & Duso, Tomaso & Pennings, Enrico, 2008. "On the Stability of Research Joint Ventures: Implications for Collusion," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 240, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Tomaso Duso, & Enrico Pennings & Jo Seldeslachts, 2008. "On The Stability of Research Joint Ventures: Implications for Collusion," CIG Working Papers SP II 2008-15, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
- L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
- L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
- L52 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Industrial Policy; Sectoral Planning Methods
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Eliane Catilina & Robert Feinberg, 2006. "Market Power and Incentives to Form Research Consortia," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 129-144, 03.
- Cabral, Luis M. B., 2000. "R&D cooperation and product market competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(7), pages 1033-1047, October.
- Duso, Tomaso & Pennings, Enrico & Seldeslachts, Jo, 2007.
"The Dynamics of Research Joint Ventures: A Panel Data Analysis,"
Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
221, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Tomaso Duso & Enrico Pennings & Jo Seldeslachts, 2008. "The Dynamics of Research Joint Ventures: A Panel Data Analysis," CIG Working Papers SP II 2007-12, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
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- Thomas W. Ross, 2009. "Sustaining Cooperation with Joint Ventures," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 25(1), pages 31-54, May.
- Reuer, Jeffrey J. & Zollo, Maurizio, 2005. "Termination outcomes of research alliances," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 101-115, February.
- Vonortas, Nicholas S., 1997. "Research joint ventures in the US," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 26(4-5), pages 577-595, December.
- B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1990. "Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 1-26, Spring.
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