Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Study Of Signalling Games On The Labour Force Market Of Eu-27,The Pure Strategy Case

Contents:

Author Info

  • Stelian STANCU

    (Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania)

  • Tudorel ANDREI

    (Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania)

  • Oana Madalina PREDESCU

    (Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania)

  • George Viorel VOINESCU

    (Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania)

Abstract

The paper addresses several key issues in the field of game theory, namely: determination of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium for signaling games - the pure strategy case; signaling on the labor force market; application of the signaling game on the labor force market of EU-27. The analysis of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium for signaling games - the pure strategy case has lead to the following conclusion: if the Sender strategy is unifying or separating then the equilibrium will be called unifying or, respectively separating.In the section Signaling on the labor force market, there are issues regarding the complete information case, where we suppose that the worker’s ability is common information for all players, but also issues regarding the incomplete information case. Three types of perfect Bayesian equilibriums may exist in this last model: unifying equilibrium, when both types of workers choose a single type of education; separating equilibrium, when the perfect Bayesian equilibrium is separating by itself, and hybrid equilibrium, if a worker chooses a level of education with certainty, the other one may randomly choose between joining the fist one (by selecting the level of education of the first type) and getting separated from him (by selecting a different level of education).This analysis allows us to draw the following conclusions: in case of signaling games on the labor force market, the pure strategy case, three types of equilibriums are available: unifying, separating and hybrid; as the worker’s ability is private information, this allows a low ability worker to pretend to be a high ability worker; the low ability workers find it more difficult to accumulate additional education requiring higher wages in return; besides the classical separating equilibrium, same as for the unifying equilibrium, there are other separating equilibriums implying a different educational choice by the high ability worker; sometimes the separating equilibrium becomes the limit of the hybrid equilibrium. The application is meant to strengthen, at least partially, given the lack of consistent data, the theoretical results.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.seap.usv.ro/annals/arhiva/ANNALS%20vol.10,nr.2(12),2010%20fulltext.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by "Stefan cel Mare" University of Suceava, Romania, Faculty of Economics and Public Administration in its journal The Annals of the "Stefan cel Mare" University of Suceava. Fascicle of The Faculty of Economics and Public Administration.

Volume (Year): 10 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2(12) (December)
Pages: 61-70

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:scm:ausvfe:v:10:y:2010:i:2(12):p:61-70

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Universitatii 9, 720225; Suceava
Phone: +40 230 522978
Fax: +40 230 216147
Email:
Web page: http://www.seap.usv.ro
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: signalling games; feasible strategy class; perfect Bayesian equilibrium; incomplete information; sender; receiver; labour force market; competition among companies;

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:scm:ausvfe:v:10:y:2010:i:2(12):p:61-70. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Liviu Scutariu).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.