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Evolutionary considerations in the framing of social norms

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  • Brian Skyrms

    ()
    (UC Irvine and Stanford University, USA)

  • Kevin J.S. Zollman

    (Carnegie Mellon University, USA)

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    Abstract

    In this article, we aim to illustrate evolutionary explanations for the emergence of framing effects, discussed in detail in Cristina Bicchieri's The Grammar of Society. We show how framing effects might evolve which coalesce two economically distinct interactions into a single one, leading to apparently irrational behavior in each individual interaction. Here we consider the now well-known example of the ultimatum game, and show how this 'irrational' behavior might result from a single norm which governs behavior in multiple games. We also show how framing effects might result in radically different play in strategically identical situations. We consider the Hawk-Dove game (the game of chicken) and also the Nash bargaining game. Here arbitrary tags or signals might result in one party doing better than another.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by in its journal Politics, Philosophy & Economics.

    Volume (Year): 9 (2010)
    Issue (Month): 3 (August)
    Pages: 265-273

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    Handle: RePEc:sae:pophec:v:9:y:2010:i:3:p:265-273

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    Related research

    Keywords: Evolutionary game theory; framing effects; replicator dynamics; Nash bargaining game; ultimatum game; Hawk-Dove game;

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