Is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation System a Regime? A Comment on Trevor McMorris Tate

It is often stated in academic analysis as well as in public discussions that there is a nuclear proliferation regime. The rather limited proliferation of nuclear weapons since the 1960s is then said to be the result of the erection and fairly successful working of this international regime. This view is criticized using a recent article in this journal as an example. One problem with the international regime approach is that proponents are often not very clear on who is in and who is out of regimes. In the area of non-proliferation, with its multitude of treaties, arrangements and policies, the distinction is especially difficult. It probably makes more sense to speak of several rather than just one international nonproliferation regime. While these regimes have important places in non-proliferation, analysis only looking at them misses important aspects. One is that national decision-making is influenced by norms around non-proliferation that are not international regimes. The neglect of norm-building reflects a major shortcoming of the international regime approach, namely its state-centeredness. This defect has consequences for the analysis of the importance of elements within the international non-proliferation area. Policy recommendations based solely on international regime analysis are misleading. Diplomats, policy-makers and the public concerned about nuclear non-proliferation are better advised if the problem is put into a larger perspective including both institutional and normative aspects.