Normative Constraints on the Use of Force Short of War

In order to ascertain whether international legal norms can contribute to the inhibition of recourse to war by states, a 'focused comparison' of norm change and the frequency with which serious disputes be tween states escalated to war was made of two discrete historical systems, the Metternichean Concert (1816-1848) and the so-called period of European unification (1849-1870) prior to the Bismarkian Con cert. The evidence suggests the capacity of norms to constrain war is contingent upon the ability of the great powers to reach consensus on, give salient attention to, and create a meaningful international se curity regime. In addition, that regime's rules must specify the conditions under which forcible methods short of war are permissible, including a definition of when retorsion and reprisal are permissible pro cedures for the redress of grievances. However, the historical evidence indicates that these conditions are met only rarely, and that the formation of such an international security regime is ephemeral and is governed by a cyclical process. The study concludes with an examination of the implications of these findings for the maintenance of peace in the contemporary global system.