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Foreign Aid and Voting in the UN General Assembly, 1967—1976

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  • Kul B. Rai

    (Southern Connecticut State College, U.S.A.)

Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between foreign (economic) aid and the General Assembly votes for the period 1967-76. The countries included in this study are the United States, the Soviet Union, and those of their aid recipients which are considered less developed. Two related hypotheses, one on the use of aid as an inducement and the other as a reward or a punishment, are tested. The methods used are Index of Agreement, devised by Arend Lijphart, and Pearson's r. The findings indicate that the American aid is more effective as an inducement and the Soviet aid is more effective as a reward or a punishment. The former has a closer association with the General Assembly votes from 1967-73 than in later years. Economic aid is increasingly used by the United States more to serve its security interests in the Middle East than for any other purpose, and it is possible that not so much of a return for the American aid is expected in the UN as was the case earlier.

Suggested Citation

  • Kul B. Rai, 1980. "Foreign Aid and Voting in the UN General Assembly, 1967—1976," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 17(3), pages 269-277, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:joupea:v:17:y:1980:i:3:p:269-277
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    Cited by:

    1. Axel Dreher & Valentin F. Lang & B. Peter Rosendorff & James Raymond Vreeland, 2018. "Buying Votes and International Organizations: The Dirty Work-Hypothesis," CESifo Working Paper Series 7329, CESifo.
    2. Ilyana Kuziemko & Eric Werker, 2006. "How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(5), pages 905-930, October.
    3. Broich, Tobias, 2017. "Do authoritarian regimes receive more Chinese development finance than democratic ones? Empirical evidence for Africa," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 180-207.
    4. Axel Dreher & Peter Nunnenkamp & Rainer Thiele, 2008. "Does US aid buy UN general assembly votes? A disaggregated analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(1), pages 139-164, July.
    5. Strüver, Georg, 2012. "What Friends Are Made Of: Bilateral Linkages and Domestic Drivers of Foreign Policy Alignment with China," GIGA Working Papers 209, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies.
    6. Broich, Tobias, 2017. "Do authoritarian regimes receive more Chinese development finance than democratic ones? Empirical evidence for Africa," MERIT Working Papers 2017-011, United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).

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