IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/jocore/v64y2020i6p1011-1042.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Credible Nuclear Security Commitments Can Backfire: Explaining Domestic Support for Nuclear Weapons Acquisition in South Korea

Author

Listed:
  • Lauren Sukin

Abstract

How does the alliance between a client state and its nuclear ally influence support for proliferation in the client? Conventional wisdom suggests that when nuclear security guarantees are not credible, support for proliferation will be high, since a domestic nuclear capability offers an alternative source of deterrence. I introduce a new theory, which posits that highly credible security guarantees can backfire by causing some individuals to fear their ally might miscalculate—either by using nuclear weapons in an unnecessary preventative attack or by precipitous escalation of a crisis or conflict. Survey experiments conducted among representative samples of South Korean citizens in 2018 and 2019 support this theory, showing that increases in the credibility of the US nuclear security guarantee lead to increased support for nuclear proliferation among South Korean respondents.

Suggested Citation

  • Lauren Sukin, 2020. "Credible Nuclear Security Commitments Can Backfire: Explaining Domestic Support for Nuclear Weapons Acquisition in South Korea," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 64(6), pages 1011-1042, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:64:y:2020:i:6:p:1011-1042
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002719888689
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002719888689
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/0022002719888689?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Tannenwald, Nina, 1999. "The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 53(3), pages 433-468, July.
    2. Christensen, Thomas J. & Snyder, Jack, 1990. "Chain gangs and passed bucks: predicting alliance patterns in multipolarity," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 44(2), pages 137-168, April.
    3. Press, Daryl G. & Sagan, Scott D. & Valentino, Benjamin A., 2013. "Atomic Aversion: Experimental Evidence on Taboos, Traditions, and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 107(1), pages 188-206, February.
    4. James D. Fearon, 1997. "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 41(1), pages 68-90, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Christopher W. Blair & Jonathan A. Chu & Joshua A. Schwartz, 2022. "The Two Faces of Opposition to Chemical Weapons: Sincere Versus Insincere Norm-Holders," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 66(4-5), pages 677-703, May.
    2. Brian C. Rathbun & Rachel Stein, 2020. "Greater Goods: Morality and Attitudes toward the Use of Nuclear Weapons," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 64(5), pages 787-816, May.
    3. Neil Narang & Rupal N. Mehta, 2019. "The Unforeseen Consequences of Extended Deterrence: Moral Hazard in a Nuclear Client State," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 63(1), pages 218-250, January.
    4. Benjamin Fordham & Paul Poast, 2016. "All Alliances Are Multilateral," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 60(5), pages 840-865, August.
    5. Clayton L. Thyne, 2006. "Cheap Signals with Costly Consequences," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 50(6), pages 937-961, December.
    6. Alejandro Quiroz Flores, 2011. "Alliances as Contiguity in Spatial Models of Military Expenditures," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 28(4), pages 402-418, September.
    7. Yuleng Zeng, 2020. "Bluff to peace: How economic dependence promotes peace despite increasing deception and uncertainty," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(6), pages 633-654, November.
    8. Matthew O. Jackson & Massimo Morelli, 2007. "Political Bias and War," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(4), pages 1353-1373, September.
      • Jackson, Matthew O. & Morelli, Massimo, "undated". "Political bias and war," Working Papers 1247, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    9. Mehmet Ekmekci & Nenad Kos, 2020. "Signaling Covertly Acquired Information," Working Papers 658, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    10. Choong-Nam Kang, 2017. "Capability revisited: Ally’s capability and dispute initiation1," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 34(5), pages 546-571, September.
    11. Cullen S. Hendrix, 2014. "Oil Prices and Interstate Conflict Behavior," Working Paper Series WP14-3, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    12. Zhiyuan Wang & Hyunjin Youn, 2018. "Locating the External Source of Enforceability: Alliances, Bilateral Investment Treaties, and Foreign Direct Investment," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 99(1), pages 80-96, March.
    13. Jonathan A. Chu, 2019. "A Clash of Norms? How Reciprocity and International Humanitarian Law affect American Opinion on the Treatment of POWs," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 63(5), pages 1140-1164, May.
    14. Ivan Savic & Zachary C. Shirkey, 2009. "Trust in the Balance," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 21(4), pages 483-507, October.
    15. Paul K. Huth, 1998. "Major Power Intervention in International Crises, 1918-1988," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 42(6), pages 744-770, December.
    16. Pitsoulis Athanassios & Schwuchow Soeren C., 2014. "Coercion, Credibility, and Mid-Air Interceptions of Military Planes," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 20(4), pages 697-707, December.
    17. Victor Asal & Nazli Avdan & Gary Ackerman, 2023. "Breaking taboos: Why insurgents pursue and use CBRN weapons," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 60(2), pages 193-208, March.
    18. Brett Ashley Leeds & Andrew G. Long & Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, 2000. "Reevaluating Alliance Reliability," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 44(5), pages 686-699, October.
    19. Thomas Jensen & Andreas Madum, 2014. "Partisan Optimism and Political Bargaining," Discussion Papers 14-05, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    20. Thomas Jensen & Andreas Madum, 2017. "Partisan optimism and political bargaining," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(2), pages 191-213, April.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:64:y:2020:i:6:p:1011-1042. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://pss.la.psu.edu/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.