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Secrecy among Friends: Covert Military Alliances and Portfolio Consistency

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  • Raymond Kuo

Abstract

Scholars think that friendly nations adopt secrecy to avoid domestic costs and facilitate cooperation. But this article uncovers a historical puzzle. Between 1870 and 1916, over 80 percent of alliance ties were partially or completely covert. Otherwise, hidden pacts are rare. Why was secrecy prevalent in this particular period and not others? This article presents a theory of “portfolio consistency.†Public agreements undermine the rank of hidden alliances. A partner willing to openly commit to another country but not to you signals the increased importance of this other relationship. States pressure their covert partners to avoid subsequent public pacts. This creates a network effect: the more secret partners a state has, the greater the incentives to maintain secrecy in later military agreements. Covert alliances have a cumulative effect. In seeking the flexibility of hidden partnerships, states can lock themselves into a rigid adherence to secrecy.

Suggested Citation

  • Raymond Kuo, 2020. "Secrecy among Friends: Covert Military Alliances and Portfolio Consistency," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 64(1), pages 63-89, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:64:y:2020:i:1:p:63-89
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002719849676
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Raymond Kuo & Brian Dylan Blankenship, 2022. "Deterrence and Restraint: Do Joint Military Exercises Escalate Conflict?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 66(1), pages 3-31, January.

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