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Unilateral Influence on International Bureaucrats

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  • Johannes Urpelainen

    (Department of Political Science, Columbia University, New York City, NY, USA)

Abstract

The conventional wisdom emphasizes agency slack or bias as the central problem of international delegation. I show that the possibility of a unilateral influence contest is equally problematic. States can exert unilateral influence on autonomous international bureaucrats, either through rewards or through punishments, to pursue their particular interests. A costly contest results, so some states could refuse to delegate because they expect others to be too influential. The analysis has four counterintuitive empirical implications. First, international agreements often favor institutionally weak states that are disadvantaged in the unilateral influence contest. Second, states could limit the autonomy of an international organization even if this prompts bad policies. Third, a state can sometimes profitably exchange distributional concessions for autonomy. Finally, constraints on unilateral influence are possible only if a disadvantaged state can credibly commit to compensating an advantaged state for it. A central broader contribution of the analysis is to show how power politics influences the rational design of international institutions.

Suggested Citation

  • Johannes Urpelainen, 2012. "Unilateral Influence on International Bureaucrats," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 56(4), pages 704-735, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:56:y:2012:i:4:p:704-735
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    Cited by:

    1. Liesbet Hooghe & Gary Marks, 2015. "Delegation and pooling in international organizations," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 305-328, September.
    2. Michal Parízek, 2017. "Control, soft information, and the politics of international organizations staffing," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 559-583, December.

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