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Accession Rules for International Institutions

Author

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  • Christina J. Schneider
  • Johannes Urpelainen

Abstract

Powerful states often accept unanimity voting on accession to international institutions, even though this enables weak states to blackmail powerful states into providing costly side payments. Whereas the literature attributes this choice mainly to efforts to bolster the legitimacy of international institutions, the authors demonstrate that the choice of unanimity also has a strategic component. The authors formally show that unanimous accession rules can profit powerful states by creating uncertainty as to the minimal level of reform that enables accession. If accession is valuable enough and the membership candidate is uncertain about the resolve of weak states, it plays safe by implementing ambitious reforms that improve the efficacy of the international institution. In this case, a legitimacy-efficacy trade-off does not exist: the unanimity rule enhances legitimacy while allowing powerful states to induce significant reforms by applicants to the benefit of current members.

Suggested Citation

  • Christina J. Schneider & Johannes Urpelainen, 2012. "Accession Rules for International Institutions," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 56(2), pages 290-312, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:56:y:2012:i:2:p:290-312
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Joel E. Smith & Johannes Urpelainen, 2017. "Removing fuel subsidies: How can international organizations support national policy reforms?," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 327-340, June.
    2. Christodoulos Kaoutzanis & Paul Poast & Johannes Urpelainen, 2016. "Not letting ‘bad apples’ spoil the bunch: Democratization and strict international organization accession rules," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 399-418, December.

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