The Institutional Design of Riparian Treaties: The Role of River Issues
AbstractInternational agreements governing rivers vary considerably in whether they contain institutional provisions for joint monitoring, conflict resolution, enforcement, and/or the delegation of authority to intergovernmental organizations. This article develops an explanation for why some river management treaties include more institutional provisions while others contain fewer, if any. The authors argue that certain types of issues related to river use—water quantity, water quality, and navigation—tend to be difficult to manage and prone to noncompliance. When forming treaties to address these specific issues, states will be more likely to include institutional provisions. The authors test the link between these river use issues and institutional design using a data set of 315 river treaties signed since 1950. The results show that highly contentious issues—and in particular water quantity and navigation—have a greater effect on the institutional design of river treaties than contextual and power politics factors.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Peace Science Society (International) in its journal Journal of Conflict Resolution.
Volume (Year): 55 (2011)
Issue (Month): 4 (August)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://pss.la.psu.edu/
cooperation; conflict; water; international institutions; transboundary rivers;
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Dinar, Shlomi & Katz, David & De Stefano, Lucia & Blankespoor, Brian, 2014. "Climate change, conflict, and cooperation : global analysis of the resilience of international river treaties to increased water variability," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6916, The World Bank.
- Jeroen Warner & Neda Zawahri, 2012. "Hegemony and asymmetry: multiple-chessboard games on transboundary rivers," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 215-229, September.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (SAGE Publications).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.