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Are Some Bribes More Harmful than Others? Exploring the Ethics Behind Anti-bribery Laws

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  • Elizabeth David-Barrett

    (Elizabeth David-Barrett is Research Fellow, Centre for Corporate Reputation, Said Business School, University of Oxford, and Director, Corruption and Transparency Research Centre, Kellogg College, Oxford. E-mail: liz.davidbarrett@sbs.ox.ac.uk)

Abstract

The proliferation of anti-bribery laws in recent years, particularly with the passage of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, sends a firm signal to companies that norms concerning corruption in international business have changed. With the increase in legal risk has come an increase in reputational risk. However, these laws and the cultures of enforcement around them, send conflicting messages about bribery being avoidable or indeed unethical. For example, many laws include an exemption or a defence for facilitation payments implying that such bribes are less unethical or that firms have a weaker responsibility to avoid paying them, than is the case for bribes ‘to gain a business advantage’. This article seeks to analyse whether this distinction has a basis in ethics. It suggests that some bribes are less harmful than others in terms of their direct impact. However, all bribes are harmful, because they always undermine the rule of law.JEL: K2 Regulation and Business Law

Suggested Citation

  • Elizabeth David-Barrett, 2014. "Are Some Bribes More Harmful than Others? Exploring the Ethics Behind Anti-bribery Laws," Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, , vol. 26(1-2), pages 119-144, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:jinter:v:26:y:2014:i:1-2:p:119-144
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    Keywords

    Law; bribery; corruption; ethics; international business; OECD;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law

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