I present a theoretical model, which could be useful to study how some institutional features can affect the size of the underground economy. Through a microeconomic approach with two different labour markets (regular and irregular), the model analyzes how some economic and institutional incentives can induce workers and firms to hide their relations. In particular, the attention is focused to the effects of some public policy instruments (fiscal contributions, unemployment benefit) on underground economy. The theoretical analysis is followed by an appropriate empirical one.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 97 (2007) Issue (Month): 2 (March-April) Pages: 227-260 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract),
plain text
(with abstract),
BibTeX,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF