Mutual Advantages of Coercion and Exit within Private Clubs and Treaty Organizations: Towards a Logic of Voluntary Association
AbstractTreaty organizations, like other clubs, attempt to solve problems that can more effectively be addressed collectively than independently. In order to address these problems, a club's leadership may be granted coercive power of various kinds. In ordinary clubs, coercive power is simply the right to exclude those who fail to pay their dues for club services. In other more coercive clubs, leaders might be given the power to penalize individual members for shirking as a means of solving free rider and coordination problems of various kinds.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by SIPI Spa in its journal Rivista di Politica Economica.
Volume (Year): 94 (2004)
Issue (Month): 4 (July-August)
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
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- Roger Congleton, 2006. "International Public Goods and Agency Problems in Treaty Organizations," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 1(4), pages 319-336, December.
- Congleton, R.D., 2007. "Democracy in America: Labor Mobility, Ideology, and Constitutional Reform," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0764, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
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